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READING MEDIEVAL MYSTICAL TEXTS  
FOR PERSONAL TRANSFORMATION TODAY: 
AN ACADEMIC SUGGESTION 
 
Edward Howells 
 
When looking at the texts that we call ‘mystical texts’ in the medieval Christian 
tradition, one cannot help noticing the significant demands placed on the reader, at 
least in the historical situation in which the texts arose and were used. These texts were 
written by and for Christians who sought a deeper appropriation of their faith within 
the contemplative and devotional life of the church. Often they explicitly require the 
reader to adopt forms of self-denial, intensified desire and personal commitment in 
order to enter into the meaning of the text and to progress towards the described goal. 
In the tradition of mystical texts based on the Song of Songs, for instance, the 
metaphor of the ‘wound of love’ between the heavenly Bridegroom and the Bride, who 
is the ‘soul’ or model for the reader, is applied not just to the Bridegroom’s wound but 
to the reader as Bride. The reader is asked to offer her own desire for the Bridegroom 
in the manner of a wound, which is a metaphor for personal vulnerability and openness 
to the divine love. In modern jargon, these texts are ‘self-implicating’, making 
demands on the reader that are personally involving. A deep commitment is expected, 
and the texts make no provision for those who might not wish to give it. 
This raises distinct problems when one shifts from the situation of a medieval 
reader, devoted to the tasks of the mystical life and often in a monastery, to today’s 
student in a university. The approach of the student is very different from the medieval 
reader. The student uses historical criticism, the history of thought and hermeneutical 
theory to interpret what the text says. She might not expect to engage her own attitudes 
of ‘woundedness’, for instance, to comprehend the text, still less to adopt an attitude of 
Christian devotion, particularly if she were not a Christian believer. Even if she did do 
these things, such attitudes would not normally be seen as part of her academic 
assessment of the text. At the other extreme, teachers of spirituality and mysticism are 
familiar with students who, on reading these texts, immediately make personal 
connections with their own ‘mystical experiences’, often to the discomfort of other 
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students in the class. The other students are right to feel that a line has been crossed, 
when the tasks of criticism are bypassed and the interpreter effectively collapses 
herself onto the text, rendering the academic exercise redundant. 
Critical distance, on the one hand, and personal commitment, on the other hand: 
these two exist as opposites, for the most part, in university study. Personal 
commitments are to be kept outside the methods and tasks of academic study, or they 
distort and short-circuit the critical endeavour. But is there a position between these 
two extremes―between the student who reduces the subject matter to their own 
experience, on the one hand, and the one who rejects any element of personal 
commitment in relation to the text, on the other hand? If we must take the latter 
approach, there is a real question as to whether we understand mystical texts correctly, 
when they make such strong demands on the commitments of the reader. I have also 
noted, in teaching and discussing these texts with students, that they often comment on 
the effect that the texts have on them personally, over the course of a period of study, 
and this is seldom at the expense of their critical engagement. On the contrary, students 
who engage in quite personal ways with the subject matter tend to produce a deeper 
critique of the text than those who simply find it alien. It is possible for their critical 
faculties to be engaged and extended rather than switched off. 
My aim here is to argue for a position between the extremes of critical distance and 
personal commitment, rejecting the dichotomy in favour of a mutual engagement, and 
one which is appropriate to university study. I am not trying to return today’s 
university students to the situation of the medieval church, with a commitment of a 
devotional kind; nor am I rejecting the public, non-confessional character of university 
study. Rather, I am noting certain possibilities of translation between the demands 
made on the medieval reader and the reader today. There are several ways that one 
might do this. One might look at the possibilities in modern literary theory which allow 
the coexistence of both a critical hermeneutic and the personal engagement of the 
reader, according to various methods. “Reader-response theory” would be an example 
of the kind of move in hermeneutics that might be sympathetic to a self-implicating 
reading of medieval mystical texts.1 There are many such potentially useful methods 
available in hermeneutical theory today. But I want to turn to the other end of 
conversation, looking not so much at modern methods as at the critical moves 
suggested in medieval texts themselves. I shall argue that there is a critical hermeneutic 
in these texts, and one not so alien that it cannot, at least in part, be adopted and used 
                                                          
1 E.g., Stanley Fish’s notion of “reader-response theory” in relation to “interpretive communities.” 
See Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). 
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by the academic reader. What is more, this form of critique is compatible with certain 
kinds of personal commitment appropriate to these texts. My argument will proceed, 
first, by identifying the place of critical moves in medieval mystical texts, especially in 
their understanding of the reader’s ‘interiority’ in relation to the text; second, I will 
consider how the reader’s critical faculties are sharpened by this kind of engagement, 
while also allowing room for a personal engagement; and third, I will offer suggestions 
as to the ways in which this combination of critical engagement and personal 
commitment can be adopted by the university student today. 
Early in many medieval mystical texts one finds a demand on the reader to recognise the 
self-implicating nature of the matter in hand. For example, John of the Cross, when 
commenting on the first lines of his poem, the Spiritual Canticle, “Where have you hidden,/ 
Beloved, and left me moaning?” (Adonde te escondiste,/ Amado, y me dejaste con gemido?), 
says: 
 
Oh soul, most beautiful among all the creatures, so anxious to know the dwelling place 
of your Beloved that you may go in quest of him and be united with him, now we are 
telling you that you yourself are his dwelling and his sweet chamber and hiding place. 
This is something of immense gladness for you, to see that all your good and hope is so 
close to you as to be within you.2 
 
The realisation that God as “the Beloved” is not outside the soul but “within” is the 
starting point of the journey introduced by the text. Self-implication is a matter of 
interiority, told in terms of seeking “within” the soul, for John of the Cross, and in this 
he follows Augustine, along with a large portion of Western medieval mystical 
writers.3 The soul is God’s “dwelling place,” so the one in search of God must look 
“within.” For John of the Cross, the evidence of this interior lies in a deep groaning of 
desire for one who seems absent, which draws one out to this other limitlessly and with 
                                                          
2 Spiritual Canticle 1:6 (Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodriguez, trans., The Collected Works of 
John of the Cross [Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 1979], 418). “Oh, pues, alma 
hermosísima entre todas las creaturas, que tanto deseas saber el lugar donde está tu Amado para buscarle 
y unirte con él, ya se te dice que tú misma eres el aposento donde él mora y ei retrete escondrijo donde 
está escondido; que es cosa de grande contentamiento y alegría para ti ver que todo tu bien y esperanza 
está tan cerca de ti que esté en ti” (Obras completas de San Juan de la Cruz, ed. Lucinio Ruano, 14th ed. 
[Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1994], 743-744). This is a good example of a text employing 
the metaphor of relational ‘wounding’ noted in the first paragraph. 
3 Following Augustine, many medieval mystical texts are framed in terms of journey which is 
entered and pursued by means of Neoplatonic self-presence or interiority. The main exceptions to this 
are texts which, following Pseudo-Dionysius, eschew a positive anthropology in favour of a more 
cosmic framework of negation, or others which focus on bridal motifs concerned with the unity of two 
in a relationship rather than with an interior journey. Sometimes these approaches are combined, 
however, making any separation between them difficult. 
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debilitating force. This inner desire is to be identified with the divine presence, but it is 
felt as absence because it also points beyond the soul, and this is explained by John in 
terms of God being ‘hidden’. God is within the soul, yet also beyond its grasp, so 
‘hidden’. To find the divine presence, the soul must first appropriate this desire, and 
then pursue it to its goal, paradoxically finding God as that which is both ‘within’ the 
soul and beyond it. This self-implicating move is understood as ‘entering within’ 
oneself. Teresa of Avila uses the same metaphor of interiority at the beginning of her 
Interior Castle: “You have already heard in some books on prayer that the soul is 
advised to enter within itself (entre dentro de sí); well, that’s the very thing I’m 
advising.”4 
What is this inner place? It is an important question to ask, because medieval 
interiority is far from modern notions of inwardness. To look inward is not necessarily, 
for medieval writers, to engage in any kind of self-analysis or assessment of ‘how it is 
to be me’. It is not to introspect, as we understand introspection today, by looking at 
my strengths and weaknesses, my character type, or my sense of well-being. ‘How are 
you in yourself?’, we say―but this is not what medieval authors mean by ‘entering in’. 
It is Augustine’s Neoplatonic interiority that they are referring to. To ‘enter in’ is to 
seek the goal of my other-directed desire, which is both central to who I am and yet 
points beyond me. The ‘self-knowledge’ that is sought here is to know myself in 
relation to another; it is a dual, relational knowing, rather than the assessment or 
inventory of an autonomous self. This is not the Cartesian self, commanding its own 
existence and already there to be found when one looks in. Rather, it is a self on the 
move, in search of itself, having its existence only in relation to another. In other words, 
‘entering in’ is to raise one’s awareness to the foundational relationality by which one 
is.  
To enter in, then, in medieval terms, does not involve a non-critical reduction of the 
meaning of the text to the dimensions of my internal world. In typically modern terms, 
to put my interpretation of a text within my personal engagement with it is to turn 
away from the world beyond my private self, and thus to remove the possibility for 
critical distance. But in the medieval approach, because the interiority in question is 
the relationship of the self with that which gives it being, it is not a privatising move, 
but one which opens the self to a greater relationality. It could more accurately be 
                                                          
4 Interior Castle 1.1.5 (Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodriguez, trans., The Collected Works of St 
Teresa of Avila [Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 1980], 2:286). “Ya havréis oído en 
algunos libros de oración aconsejar a el alma que entre dentro de sí; pues esto mesmo es” (Obras 
completas de Santa Teresa de Jesús, ed. Efrén de la Madre de Dios and Otger Steggink, 9th ed [Madrid: 
Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1997], 474). 
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called a ‘de-privatising’ move, in that the self is being asked to recognise what lies 
beyond its own limits. This gives room to criticism, in that on ‘entering in’ the self is 
seeking something more than it already knows. It is moving out of its present 
understanding into a larger understanding, which is both internal and extends beyond 
the self first known. This critical move is not limited to the internal world of the self, 
but applies to everything that it knows externally, too. The goal set out by these texts is 
to extend the self-differentiation of interiority from the self outwards, so that the 
outside world is also seen through it. It is this that allows the traditional mystical vision 
of the world as, in Gerard Manley Hopkins’ words, “charged with the grandeur of 
God.”5 The same seeing with which the soul sees itself, in an interiority differentiated 
between self and other, is extended outwards limitlessly towards God. The world is 
included in this other-directed view, so that all things are regarded as filled with the 
expansive otherness of the divine. 
The claim that I want to make is that there is room for modern readers to put 
appropriate critical distance between themselves and the world of the text, without 
departing from this medieval notion of interiority.6 The challenge for readers today 
seeking to adopt this possibility lies primarily in the understanding of the self: the self 
here is wholly relational, grounded in relation to the infinite horizon of God’s life. 
There is no autonomous self standing outside the text, observing it from a position 
untouched by the movements of the text in relation to the self. But neither is it 
necessary to shift entirely to the pre-modern self or to give way to firm theological 
suppositions about the self. The modern reader, I suggest, need only regard the self as 
incomplete and on a journey in order to be able to pursue this critical direction. As I 
shall discuss further in a minute, these texts do not determine the divine goal but prefer 
to use metaphors which allow an open-ended engagement, acknowledging the ongoing 
and incomplete nature of the project in relation to the divine, using terms for the divine 
presence such as ‘abyss’ and ‘wound’.7 The self is being drawn out by an internal 
critique and openness to the possibilities of the other, and it is in this structured, 
ongoing self-other relationality that room for creative and critical dialogue with the 
text lies. 
                                                          
5 Gerard Manley Hopkins, God’s Grandeur (Gerard Manley Hopkins, The Major Works, ed. 
Catherine Philips [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986], 128. 
6 This possibility is nicely suggested by Rowan Williams, “Theological Integrity,” in On Christian 
Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 3-15.  
7 ‘Wound’ arises as a key term for the presence of God in the tradition of mystical commentaries on 
the Song of Songs, as already noted, also drawing on connections with the story and devotions of 
Christ’s Passion; ‘abyss’ has a scriptural root in Psalm 41, “deep (or abyss) calls to deep,” providing 
another key mystical metaphor: see Bernard McGinn, “Ocean and Desert as Symbols of Mystical 
Absorption in the Christian Tradition,” Journal of Religion 74 (1994): 155-181. 
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As an example of this kind of medieval interiority, I shall turn to a foundational text 
of the Western mystical tradition, Augustine’s On the Trinity. This is primarily a text 
about the doctrine of the Trinity, but Augustine includes an interior spiritual journey, to 
make clear that the function of the doctrine of the Trinity is not to exist for its own sake 
but to point us inwardly to our source in the divine life and to engage and transform us 
there.8 The human soul is made in the ‘image of God’ (imago Dei), which means, as 
we have seen with medieval interiority in general, that the self is relational; and the 
reason for this relational constitution, Augustine argues, is that the Trinity is relational 
and the soul is created to reflect the life of the Trinity. Somewhat as we are relational in 
our deepest constitution, God is a relational life, who gives structure to our own 
relationality. Our need for others, for instance, is put there by a God who chooses to 
need us (made clear in Jesus’ death for us), rendering our creation relational and 
infinitely open to the other―ultimately requiring the divine Other as the origin and 
goal of personal existence. The fulfilment of the human soul, for Augustine, is to 
discover the source of this relationality and to understand it as an explicit participation 
in the divine life of the Trinity. ‘Entering in’, as for John of the Cross, is to identify my 
own participation in the divine Otherness at my source. The goal is face to face vision 
in heaven, for which he quotes Paul’s saying that “then shall I know even as I am 
known” (1 Cor. 13:12), noting the relational character of this knowing.9 But as we 
shall see, faith here is in a God who is largely unknown, drawing the soul out beyond 
its current boundaries, and making it a question to itself, rather than supplying an 
understanding of the soul or of God as stable entities. This is a process compatible with 
a strong element of criticism. 
For Augustine, the key critical element in the process of transformation is to 
recognise that God cannot be known other than by exploring my own obscure 
relational dependence on a source that is both beyond me, yet profoundly central to my 
self-understanding. God is to be sought as a question arising out of my self-awareness: 
of what am I aware when I am aware of myself? Who is this self, and where is it 
coming from? God is not to be thought of as a terminus outside the self but as the 
source of the relationality by which the soul is constituted. This is why we must find 
God by ‘entering in’, by interiority—in the relationality which opens out infinitely 
beyond the self while also giving it being. How do we find this mysterious dynamic 
within us? Augustine suggests several mental exercises which may help to point us 
towards it. First, he asks us to think about how we know that something is good. To 
                                                          
8 More can be found in Edward Howells, “Appropriating the Divine Presence: Reading Augustine’s 
On the Trinity as a Transformative Text,” Spiritus 11 (2011): 201-223. 
9 Trin. 12.14.22, 15.23.44. 
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know the goodness of something, we do not try to find something outside the thing that 
is the good in it, as if you had two things instead of one. Rather, goodness is a quality 
which exists in such a way that the things that we call good share in it, in order to be 
good.10 Goodness is a quality shared by the things that we call good, rather than an 
object alongside them: it is known in a participatory rather than an objectifying way. 
Augustine has a Platonic, transcendent view of the ultimate good, which allows him to 
ally the good with God, but the analogy serves even for those who do not take the 
Platonic view: it shows the basic difference between participatory knowledge and 
knowledge by object-separation. To know something by interiority, Augustine is 
suggesting, is to know it by participating in it. Just as we know goodness, we can begin 
to explore our own relationship with God, as that by which we have our being, without 
separating God into an external object. In terms of the hermeneutic that he is setting up, 
he is pointing out that there is a way of knowing things—and a way of knowing that is 
fully critical—that works not by making objects of them outside us, but by relating 
ourselves to them and seeing what we share with them inwardly. This is as normal a 
kind of knowledge as knowing exterior objects, and just as critical. To know something 
in this way requires critical distance, but it is distance found within the relationality of 
the self with the other, rather than by separating it from the self and knowing it by 
virtue of that separation. 
The second step in Augustine’s journey of interiority is to ask the reader to think of 
a concrete example of this kind of participatory knowing, in order to clarify how one 
knows in this way. The peculiar aspect of this kind of knowledge is that it is 
self-implicating: you have to think about your own involvement in this kind of 
knowing, not simply of something that you know. He gives the example of how you 
know you love your neighbour, when you love them. When you love them, he says, it 
is possible to be aware not just of the neighbour whom you love but of the love with 
which you love them. There is a critical process by which you arrive at an awareness 
that you love someone, yet it occurs within the relationship of love, rather than by 
objectifying the one loved. He chooses love because of the statement in the First Letter 
of John, that “God is love”—again, it allows him to identify this kind of knowledge 
with the knowledge of God—but his discussion of love is really aimed at analysing the 
critical character of a self-implicating kind of knowing. What kind of awareness do we 
                                                          
10 Trin. 8.3.5. “You can perceive good itself by participating in [that by] which these other things 
are good – and you understand it together with them when you hear a good this or that” (Edmund Hill, 
trans., John E. Rotelle, ed., St. Augustine: The Trinity, vol. 5 of The Works of St. Augustine, Part 1 [Hyde 
Park, NY: New City Press, 1991], 244-5). 
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have when we ‘know love’? 
In love, one both goes out of oneself to unite with the other, and knows oneself 
within this loving, as one who loves. One knows not just oneself as lover and the other 
as loved, but the love with which one loves. In other words, to know love is to 
recognise that the manner in which we can differentiate love is part of the same 
movement by which we unite with others in love. The uniting and the differentiation 
are simultaneous parts of the one act of knowing. One does not find one’s awareness of 
love by first distancing oneself from the other whom one loves, but rather by uniting 
with them and finding a critical distance within that union. The differentiation is 
wholly internal to the relationship, rather than objectifying. Augustine is suggesting 
that, by means of interiority, my self-implication or commitment to the other that I am 
seeking does not remove critical distance but actually makes it possible. I find the tools 
for differentiation only through identifying myself with that which I am seeking, 
realising that I can be critical within my relationship of dependence on and bond with 
this other. 
In relation to the mystical text, the implication is that readers who seek something 
for themselves in the text will be able to criticise it in the appropriate way, while those 
who keep the text ‘outside’ themselves, without self-implication, will misread it. At the 
same time, this is a kind of self-implication that is also critical: it is not merely a 
collapse of the self onto the meaning of the text. I find meaning by introducing critical 
distance between myself and the text, while reading it in a self-implicating way. This is 
not a simple identification of the reader with the meaning of the text, but an 
engagement that finds critical distance to be dependent on rather than outside that 
engagement. 
The third step in Augustine’s treatment is to reflect on what happens when this kind 
of interior self-differentiation takes place in relation not just to an idea of goodness or 
an imagined person whom we love, but to God. In this case, unlike in the case of the 
differentiation between two friends who are also separate human beings, there is no 
knowledge of the Other as a separate physical being. Analogies from material things 
begin to lose their grip, because we do not know God as a separate created being. 
Augustine is aware of the objection that a Christian might raise at this point: what 
about our knowledge of Christ as a human being—doesn’t that give us object 
knowledge of God? No, Augustine answers. Faith in the incarnation moves from the 
story of objective facts about Christ to the knowledge that God loves us: its purpose is 
to make us aware of God’s involvement with us in love, not to set God up as a created 
being outside us. Faith tells us that God loves us, and in a way designed to cultivate 
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our sense of personal involvement in that love.11 Faith, as Augustine says, “is not what 
one believes (quod creditur) but what one believes with (qua creditur).”12 That is to 
say, faith moves directly from facts that we believe to an interior transformation of the 
mind that believes: if it stops at the facts alone, at a merely propositional set of tenets, 
it is not faith. Faith, rather, is the intent of one who, seeing that God loves them, is able 
to identify the other of that love within themselves, as their source. It is to 
‘self-implicate’ from the tenets of faith to personal involvement in faith, which is a 
sheer relationship of love. Again, Augustine is drawing attention to the deeply 
participatory nature of this knowing, and in relation to God, situating such awareness 
in a relationship of love in which I am already involved. 
This again makes God, far from a static object of propositional belief, a mysterious 
Other who questions my sense of who I am in relation to my source, asking who the 
source of the love is with which I am loved in faith. Quoting Paul in Corinthians, 
Augustine says this: 
 
‘If anybody thinks he knows anything, he does not yet know as he ought to know. But 
anyone who loves God, this man is known by him’ (1 Cor. 8:2). . . . You notice, he 
[Paul] did not say ‘knows (cognovit) him,’ which would be a dangerous piece of 
presumption, but ‘is known (cognitus est) by him.’ . . . The right intent is the one that 
sets out from faith. 13 
 
To say that one knows God in faith is not to say that one knows any ‘thing’ apart 
from oneself, but rather to say that one finds oneself to be involved with God, in the 
manner of love. The involvement raises the question of the divine Other from within. 
Who is this that I am involved with? In other words, the God of faith is not 
pre-determined but is encountered as a question, simply as the other of the self’s 
longing and incompleteness. For the reader of the mystical text today, this again means 
that faith does not set up a barrier to a critical reading. Faith is not a matter of deciding 
what the text is about in advance, but rather of letting it implicate me to the extent that 
it questions me about my source. Faith is not a set of propositions that crushes the 
critical faculties of the reader, but the intent of one prepared to give themselves to a 
seeking in relation to the text that stops at nothing, prepared to go as far as the reading 
                                                          
11 On the effect of the incarnation on us, see esp. Trin. 4 and 13; the temporal knowledge of Christ 
(which is scientia) leads directly to wisdom (sapientia) which is participation in Christ (Trin. 13.19.24). 
12 Trin. 14.8.11 (trans., Hill and Rotelle, St. Augustine: The Trinity, 380).  
13 Trin. 9.1.1 (trans., Hill and Rotelle, St. Augustine: The Trinity, 270). “Si quis se putat aliquid 
scire, nondum scit quemadmodum scire oporteat. Quisquis autem diligit deum, hic cognitus est ab illo.’  
Nec sic quidem dixit, ‘cognovit illum,’ quae periculosa praesumptio est, sed, cognitus est ab deo. . . . 
Sed ea recta intentio est quae proficiscitur a fide.” 
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will go. Of course, even for Augustine, faith is also propositional, requiring 
propositions about God’s involvement in history that function as objective facts, but 
Augustine is adamant that the purpose of such propositions is never to lead us to the 
pride of ‘thinking that we know’ what it is that we are seeking; rather, faith is precisely 
to intensify our seeking and extend its range, settling on nothing less than the infinite 
Other of the divine. At the same time, this Other is graspable as a personal love, and 
not simply ineffable and infinite. But it extends endlessly and resists identification with 
any particular object or claim. To think that I can grasp anything about the goal of my 
seeking in advance is, Augustine says, not mincing his words, a “sacrilegious error.”14 
What, however, does Augustine mean by naming this seeking as ‘love’? For the 
modern interpreter, to call the task of reading, even self-implicating reading, one of 
love, does not seem compatible with criticism. Critical distance is surely not a matter 
of exercising too much love in relation to what you seek to know—or you may cease to 
be critical. Here Augustine’s sense of love merits some attention. If we really do not 
know what we are seeking, Augustine asks, how can we love it? The kind of ‘love’ 
required here, he answers, is of the kind which loves the seeking, rather than the goal 
of the seeking. It is a bit like a person trying to find out an unknown word. He does not 
yet know the meaning of the word, so he cannot love that; rather, what he loves is 
finding out the meaning of words in general. He has what Augustine calls “amor 
studentium,” the love of a studious spirit, or the love of learning.15 Thus, to pursue 
Augustine’s line of argument in relation to reading texts, there is no need to throw 
oneself uncritically onto the text, but rather, the aim is to be engaged in the critical task 
in the manner of love, love for the process of seeking, which extends rather than 
restricts the interpretation. Augustine’s “love of a studious spirit” is hardly 
incompatible with the attitude required in a university student today—or at least, one 
hopes not. This love refers not to a lack of criticism, but rather to a self-implication 
that is truly open to finding something new and to a real engagement in the reading. 
My intention so far has been to retrieve the medieval understanding of interiority in 
mystical texts, to show that it is a viable approach for the critical reader today. I would 
like now to make some very brief connections to modern hermeneutical theory, to 
indicate the compatibility of this approach with methods that are current in university 
study. This is not a matter of identification but of translation: modern hermeneutics are 
not the same as medieval interiority, but there are points of connection, which once 
recognised allow movement and interchange between the world of medieval interiority 
                                                          
14 Ibid. 
15 Trin. 10.1.3. 
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and university study today. The theologian David Tracy, in his chapter on “The Classic” 
in The Analogical Imagination, makes some valuable suggestions.16 He notes, first, 
that criticism should begin with the notion of a ‘conversation’ between the text and the 
reader, where understanding has “two poles.”17 Following Paul Ricoeur, he regards 
critical understanding in relation to texts as a process which “envelops” the task of 
reading from beginning to end, rather than only as the end of the process or somehow 
as outside it.18 In other words, Ricoeur and Tracy are invoking a more medieval notion 
of the self that is dual and seeking its own self-understanding in relation to the text, 
rather than a ‘single pole’ notion of the reader outside the text, standing over it in 
judgment.19 Second, it follows that the space for criticism opens up in the reader’s 
self-understanding in relation to the text, in the ‘to and fro’ of conversation. In the 
hermeneutical jargon, the space for criticism is in the world ‘in front of’ the text, 
produced between the two poles of conversation, as a critique internal to this 
conversation, rather than imposed from outside in an attempt to see the world ‘behind’ 
the text. For instance, psychological readings which claim to be able to discover the 
author’s psychology ‘behind’ the text are discredited, on this view, for failing to 
approach the question in relation to the reader, whose own psychology and 
understanding are in conversation with the text.20 It is evident that self-implication is 
central to this hermeneutical method. Criticism is directed at the self-implicating 
relationship between text and reader, finding critical distance within this relationship, 
rather than outside it. Finally, Tracy points to the process whereby readers who engage 
in this kind of reading allow themselves to be what he calls “transformed” into the 
structure of the text.21 The reader’s critical distance from the text is not set over 
against the text but is found by immersion in the critical structures of the text itself, 
that is, by seeing where the text leads the reader at a self-implicating level. The text’s 
effect on the reader involves the subject at a personal level, asking the reader to 
observe how the text affects them by means of the critical structures provided by the 
text. Thus, it can be said that the text interprets the reader, as much as the reader 
interprets the text. The two things happen together, because neither text nor reader are 
static realities, but realities in process, with criticism located in the mutual engagement 
                                                          
16 David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism 
(New York: Crossroad, 1981), 99-153. 
17 Ibid., 100-101, 260. 
18 Ibid., 118. 
19 For such a view, see Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992). 
20 Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 120-123. 
21 Ibid., 114. 
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between them, rather than introduced from without. I assess the text by seeing myself 
as a critical participant in its action in relation to me, criticising the process by which 
the text seeks to transform me, and perhaps extending this to questioning how 
satisfactorily it transforms me. 
For students of medieval mystical texts today, a number of points must follow. First, 
students should recognise that when mystical texts seek to implicate them, asking them 
to bear their interior ‘wound’ of desire in relation to the text, for instance, this move to 
self-implication need not be resisted. It is not ‘unacademic’ to find personal resonances 
with the text. However, having engaged one’s desire in this way, there is a critical task 
in finding out how one is being moved by the text as a reader. This is not merely a 
personal question, but one appropriate to academic enquiry: how does the text work for 
the transformation of readers in general? Can I identify and express the structures of 
transformation that are present for all readers, and thus attain a reading that is not just 
critical but also public, rather than merely private?22 Third, such understanding can be 
attained within the trajectory of a self-implicating reading, rather than only as a 
reflection on it or subsequent step after it. I must remain at the level of my engagement 
with the text in order to express how it works on readers in general; I do not move 
from my engagement to some more objective stance outside the text, or I lose touch 
with the very structures that I am trying to express. For instance, if I want to explore 
the historical and theological context of the metaphors of the text, I can do this while 
keeping hold of my personal engagement with those metaphors, rather than seeing the 
two activities as incompatible. I can investigate the historical meaning of the term 
‘wound of love’ in mystical texts, discovering its resonances in historical devotions to 
Christ’s passion, for instance, while remaining concerned with how the text is working 
at the level of my own self-implication: the two things can progress together. 
A question, of course, arises in the case of the student who finds no personal 
resonance with a text and thus feels no self-implication. But in this case, just as one 
would ask a student reading a novel to make some effort to engage in the story, rather 
than allowing them to say only ‘it has no relevance for me’, there is a work for the 
imagination on the part of the student, to ask, ‘assuming that I was the kind of person 
who was interested in this text, what would it mean to me?’ Such moves can produce 
the necessary level of self-implication for the reading. Self-implication need not mean 
                                                          
22 Mary Frohlich, who teaches Christian Spirituality in a Catholic seminary in Chicago, has written 
on this kind of appropriation of mystical texts. Mary Frohlich, “Spiritual Discipline, Discipline of 
Spirituality: Revisiting Questions of Definition and Method,” in Minding the Spirit: The Study of 
Christian Spirituality, ed. Elizabeth A. Dreyer and Mark S. Burrows (London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2005), 64-78. 
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an attitude of devoted identification with the quest, only the willingness, as Augustine 
would say, to ‘love’ the process, to want to put oneself in the position of learning in 
relation to the unknown of the text, at a level sufficient for the text to be read properly. 
There is only one aspect of reading medieval mystical texts in the university that 
cannot replace the demands of medieval interiority. This is the task of spiritual 
discernment, of assessing the transformation of readers at a personal level. Is reading 
this text good for this person at this time, in their spiritual development? That is a 
question outside the realm of university study. The obstacle is not that the texts claim 
authority. In any genuine reading, as we have seen, readers must engage with the 
otherness of the text, being open to its claims, while also being critical. In the case of 
belief in God and personal commitment to God, I have noted that medieval interiority 
introduces God not in an authoritarian manner that predetermines the interpretation but 
as a foundational questioning at the level of the source of the self, which makes room 
for criticism rather than stifling it. Still, beyond this, it is the decision to identify this 
particular reading with the action of God that rests outside the university context, 
requiring instead a community of faith to sustain, test and nurture it. If I choose to see 
God at work in my reading of John of the Cross, for example, that is not something 
that I can hope to justify or confirm in purely academic terms. It is a matter for 
discernment within a community of faith. Nevertheless, it is possible, in an academic 
setting, to make generalised assessments of the structures and movements of spiritual 
transformation. One can examine, for instance, how certain groups, such as business 
people, might relate to various mystical texts in a transformative way and investigate 
the patterns of their transformation closely, even affirming them to be consistent with 
particular views of spiritual development within faith communities, without making a 
claim for divine action. One can, equally, draw on various criteria from the literature 
on spiritual growth to help understand the ways in which texts transform their 
readers.23 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Personal commitment of a certain kind should not be seen as antithetical to the task of 
reading medieval mystical texts in the university today. I have sought to show that 
there is a kind of personal commitment which shares much with the interiority of these 
texts that is also compatible with academic criticism, and not just compatible with it, 
                                                          
23 For example, David Lonsdale, “‘TOLLE, LEGE’: Reading and Discernment as a Source of 
Personal Transformation,” in Sources of Transformation: Revitalising Christian Spirituality (London: 
Continuum, 2010), 41-56. 
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but actively motivating criticism. The attitude of faith prescribed by medieval Christian 
writers demands a kind of openness in relation to the world of the text, rather than 
belief in some fixed goal; the place of belief or faith is to open the reader to this 
possibility more rigorously, rather than to rest in static presuppositions, even pious 
ones. The material of the text, drawing on the language of Christian scripture and 
narrative, may be alien for many university students, but the imaginative task of 
self-implication is the same as it would be in, say, reading a novel. Criticism provides a 
way of deepening this personal engagement with the text. I criticise these texts by 
gaining a purchase on how they work on me; I allow myself to be taken into their 
world, and I observe how they seek to change me. I emerge more aware of the 
presuppositions not only of the text but of myself. In particular, as a modern reader, I 
notice that my view of the self may be more fixed, more autonomous and less open to 
transformation than that demanded by the medieval mystical text. To read it better, to 
be more critical, I need to make myself more open in relation to the text, a truly 
seeking, shifting, ongoing ‘I’, needing this other for my self-understanding. A decisive 
moment for the reader is to reach a point of involvement with the text where they find 
themselves ‘read’ by the text, that is, actually informed by the structures of the text as 
to their own involvement in the text, thus better known to themselves through the 
reading. The text then points the reader to the terms which explain their own 
engagement with the text. These terms are not merely personal but public, and open to 
an academic, critical expression. Such an approach denies the dichotomy of personal 
commitment, on the one hand, and critical distance, on the other. 
 
